If you sized this chain off the registry on 2026-08-17, it was roughly 137.6 times larger than it looked. The default-launch habit on it is unmapped and unclaimed. This is not an opinion, it is a count of every Initialize event the PoolManager has emitted. The chain is live, so the count climbs: the same read on 2026-07-18 returned 1,174 hooks across 40,038 hooked pools. Concentration is extreme: a single hook accounts for 76,391 of those 133,714 hooked pools, 57% of them.
01M06GRET7QVTG9WB3M9FZ902Y
(query 8266138), which ended 2026-08-17T00:09:51Z. The permission counter is from
execution 01M06GVCNFX4F3CFJZR95HH472 (query 8266140), which ended
2026-08-17T00:11:00.093534Z. Both count distinct hooks independently and both returned
6,878, which is the read checking itself rather than us asserting it.
Three properties, each one a thing competitors cannot copy without giving up something they are keeping.
LaunchHook, the Uniswap v4 hook, holds the pool’s liquidity itself: the full-range position is owned by the hook, and the escrowed quote sits as hook-held ERC-6909 claims. The contract exposes no remove path for either one. Fee value leaves through _payout: the creator’s claim, the crew sweep, the buyback sweep to the vault, and the treasury sweep. Sellers on the curve are paid from escrow. None of these can reach the position. The source is verified on Blockscout, so that is something you confirm by reading it rather than something we ask you to accept. Contracts that promise a fair launch typically keep the keys that make the promise breakable. A contract with no exit from the position cannot betray the pool, and that is a commitment none of them can match while they still hold their own optionality.
Fee capture happens at the pool, independent of which interface routes the trade. Any terminal, bot, or aggregator on the chain that routes to an UNTOLL pool does so with no integration, no partnership, no BD call. No interface has to be asked, and none can be prevented from routing to it. The distribution surface is every trading interface on the chain, by default.
A second contract, SessionKeyDelegate, carries all of the agent scope: it installs on the agent’s own account under an EIP-7702 delegation and enforces targets, selectors, a per-transaction cap, a recipient policy and an expiry in bytecode, where a jailbroken model cannot reach it, and an out-of-scope call mines a ScopeViolation event rather than failing silently. The hook carries no agent-authority code; the two are separate contracts doing separate jobs. A compromised agent can act, but in the demo every attempt to redirect its money is stopped on chain, and you check that yourself rather than take it on faith. That converts the agent-with-money problem from a trust game into a verification game, which is the layer the agent-payment standards still lack beneath them.
The hook is open source and deployed, source-verified, on public testnet 46630. SessionKeyDelegate is open source and runs on the local chain the demo starts.